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Abstract
Adversarial risk analysis (ARA) is a relatively new area of research that informs decision-making when facing
intelligent opponents and uncertain outcomes. It enables an analyst to express her Bayesian beliefs about an
opponent’s utilities, capabilities, probabilities and the type of strategic calculation that the opponent is using.
Within that framework, the analyst then solves the problem from the perspective of the opponent while placing
subjective probability distributions on all unknown quantities. This produces a distribution over the actions
of the opponent that permits the analyst to maximize her expected utility. This overview covers conceptual,
modeling, computational and applied issues in ARA.
1 Introduction
Adversarial risk analysis (ARA) guides decision-making when there are intelligent oppo-
nents and uncertain outcomes. It is a decision-theoretic alternative to classical game theory
that uses Bayesian subjective distributions to model the goals, resources, beliefs, and rea-
soning of the opponent. Within this framework, the analyst solves the problem from the
perspective of her opponent while placing subjective probability distributions on all un-
known quantities. This provides a distribution over the actions of the opponent that enables
her to maximize her expected utility, accounting for the uncertainty she has about the op-
ponent.
Game theory is the standard approach to adversarial reasoning, and it has been applied,
among many other areas, in politics (Brams, 2011), biology (Hammerstein and Selten,
1994), economics (Samuelson, 2016), social sciences (Shubik, 1982) and cybersecurity
(Shiva et al., 2010). The cornerstone of game theory is the Nash equilibrium, in which no
opponent can improve their outcome by any unilateral action. Of course, this methodology
has been generalized and extended in many ways (Halpern, 2008). Nonetheless, the fun-
damental premises of game theory have been criticized (Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis,
2004; Young, 2004). The main concerns are:
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• The classical formulation generally assumes that all participants in the game have
the same beliefs about the other players, and that all players know those beliefs are
known. This common knowledge assumption is frequently unrealistic. For example,
in a three-person auction, it is quite possible for players A and B to have different
distributions for the value to player C of the item on offer and that they will conceal
that information.
• The field of behavioral economics has repeatedly demonstrated that humans do not
act as game theory would prescribe (Camerer, 2003; Gintis, 2009), so it is a poor
predictor of real-world decisions.
• Game theory generally finds pessimistic and expensive solutions; it assumes that the
opponent will do the most damaging thing possible, and thus the analyst must invest
in expensive protection. But often opponents are not so ruthless or so calculating.
• The game theory paradigm assumes that each opponent is hyperlogical and capable of
infinite computation. Researchers have weakened these assumptions in many ways;
e.g., through bounded rationality (Simon, 1955), prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman,
1979), and computing constraints (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1998). But the core idea
remains problematic.
• Although the judgments of a supported agent could be arguably well assessed, as
explained in Keeney (2007), knowledge about the other agents’ judgments is less
precise, since it requires them to reveal beliefs and preferences. Such disclosure is
unrealistic in cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and other domains, where information
is concealed by adversaries.
• In spite of this, uncertainty in the adversary judgments is not frequently acknowl-
edged and game theoretic solutions are often sensitive to such inputs as shown in
examples in Ekin et al. (2019).
• Game solutions can have multiple equilibria with no clear criteria to choose among
them (Raiffa et al., 2002). Opponent A may select a strategy corresponding to one
equilibrium, while opponent B could play a strategy corresponding to a different
equilibrium; see Russell (1998) for developments in coordination games.
• Except for toy problems, computing the game theoretic solution is difficult, often to
the point of impracticability; see Nisan et al. (2007) for issues in computational game
theory.
None of these criticisms is a sockdologer argument, and game theorists have worked hard
to shore up these deficiencies. But although the equilibrium perspective is attractive, it is
also compelling to maximize one’s expected utility as in ARA.
Indeed, the ARA perspective is actually very natural. One builds a model for the thinking of
one’s opponent, and then maximizes expected utility under that model. For example, when
someone asks the boss for a raise, the first step is to understand what the boss values and
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what criteria he will use. If that understanding is correct, the employee has a reasonable
chance of success; but if the model for the boss’s thought process is wrong, then the outcome
will likely be disappointing.
One of the advantages of ARA is its ability to partition the uncertainty into three separate
components (Merrick and Parnell, 2011). The first is aleatory uncertainty, which is the un-
certainty in the outcome conditional on the choices of each the opponents; this is handled
by conventional statistical risk analysis Bedford et al. (2001); Cox Jr (2013). The second
component is epistemic uncertainty. Usually, one does not know an opponent’s utility func-
tion, nor his assessment of the probability of outcomes conditional on the decisions that
are made, nor even his resources; but a Bayesian should be comfortable making subjective
probability assessments about each of these quantities. The third component is concept un-
certainty. This reflects the fact that the analyst does not know how her opponent is making
his decision. Perhaps he is a game theorist and seeks an equilibrium solution. Or perhaps
he randomizes, or follows some other protocol.
To make this a little more concrete, consider a sealed bid auction between Daphne and
Apollo, each of whom wants to own a first edition of the Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. Daphne’s aleatory uncertainty is the value she receives conditional on her bid
and Apollo’s. If she has not been allowed to examine the book prior to the auction, then
its condition is a random variable–perhaps it is old and torn, or perhaps it has marginalia
written by John Nash, and both circumstances affect its value. Epistemic uncertainty arises
because Daphne does not know the value of the book to Apollo, nor what he thinks is
the probability that he will win with a bid of x dollars, nor how much money Apollo has.
The concept uncertainty reflects the fact that Daphne does not know whether Apollo is
determining his bid using classical game theory (Milgrom and Weber, 1982), or whether he
is simply bidding some unknown fraction of his true top-dollar value, or using some other
principle.
As we shall see, ARA can lead to mathematical formulations whose complexity is compara-
ble to that found in game theory. There is no easy way to reason about other people’s strate-
gic thinking in realistic situations. Nonetheless, the decision-theoretic approach sidesteps
some of the common criticisms of game theory.
2 Auctions
To illustrate how ARA works, we shall build out the discussion of auctions. It is convenient
to assume that Daphne and Apollo have had the opportunity to examine the book before
the sealed-bid auction, which simplifies things by eliminating the aleatory uncertainty. And
suppose Daphne has a subjective distribution F (x) about the probability she will win the
auction with a bid of x. Then, if her true top-dollar value for the book is x0, assuming risk
neutrality, she maximizes her expected utility by bidding
x∗ = argmaxx∈R+(x0 − x)F (x).
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Her utility is her profit x0 − x, and the probability of realizing that profit is F (x).
How does Daphne acquire her subjective probability F (x) regarding her probability of
winning? There are several ways, and these depend upon which solution concept she thinks
Apollo will use. In the simplest, she models Apollo as non-strategic, and believes he will
bid some unknown fraction of his true, also unknown, value. As a Bayesian, Daphne is
comfortable placing a subjective distribution G(p) on the fraction of the true value that
Apollo will bid (0 ≤ p ≤ 1), and she can place a subjective distribution H(v) on the value
of the book to Apollo. Then, simple calculation shows that
F (x) = IP[PV ≤ x] =
∫ ∞
0
∫ x/v
0
g(p)h(v)dpdv (1)
where g(p) and h(v) are the densities of G(p) and H(v), respectively.
A second common solution concept Apollo might use is the Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE).
The BNE formulation makes a strong common knowledge (CK) assumption: both Apollo
and Daphne have distributions HA andHD for each other’s valuation, and each knows both
distributions and knows that the other knows them. This leads to solving a system of first-
order ordinary differential equations. For an asymmetric auction, whenHA 6= HD, no gen-
eral solution exists, although it is known that ifHA andHD are differentiable then a unique
solution exists and it is also differentiable (Lebrun, 1999). Previous attempts at solutions are
based on the backshooting algorithm (Hubbard et al., 2013), but Fibich and Gavish (2011)
have shown that all such solutions are inherently unstable. Au (2014) has an algorithm that
succeeds, based on the limit of discretized bids and points of indifference.
From an ARA perspective, the CK assumption can be replaced by something more reason-
able. Daphne has a subjective belief about the distribution HA of Apollo’s value, and she
has a subjective belief about HD, the distribution she believes he thinks is the distribution
of her value. TheHA and HD are epistemic uncertainties.
In this BNE framework, she thinks Apollo will solve a system of coupled equations:
argmax
d∈IR+(D
∗ − d)FA(d) ∼ FD
argmax
a∈IR+(A
∗ − a)FD(a) ∼ FA (2)
whereD∗ ∼ HD,A
∗ ∼ HA, and FA and FD are the distributions of Apollo’s and Daphne’s
bids, respectively. The equilibrium solution gives FA, her best guess, under the BNE solu-
tion concept, of the distribution for Apollo’s bid. Now Daphne should step outside the BNE
framework and solve x∗ = argmax
x∈IR+(x0 − x)FA(x) where x0 is Daphne’s true value
for the book, which of course is known to her.
For a two-person auction, this solution is the same as found from a BNE analysis. But
with more than two persons, the solution will diverge: Daphne can believe their opponent
will bid high, but also think that Apollo thinks he will bid low. This allows non-common
4
knowledge, and to distinguish this case from the BNE, we call it a ”mirroring argument”
since Daphne is trying to do the analysis she thinks her opponents are doing.
A third important solution concept is level-k thinking (Stahl and Wilson, 1995). A level-0
bidder is non-strategic. A level-1 bidder thinks the opponent is non-strategic, and optimizes
her bid against a model for his behavior (as previously discussed). A level-2 bidder thinks
her opponent is a level-1 thinker who is modeling her as a level-0 thinker. This can get
complicated, but except in highly structured games such as chess, empirical studies indicate
that people rarely go beyond level-2 thinking (Stahl and Wilson, 1994).
To illustrate, suppose Daphne is a level-2 bidder. She thinks Apollo is a level-1 bidder,
who models her as a non-strategic bidder. Assume she believes that Apollo thinks her true
value for the book has the uniform distribution on [$100, $200] and that she bids a random
fraction p of her value, where F (p) = p9 of 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. From (1), it follows that Apollo
thinks her bid will have the distribution
F (d) =
(
d− 100
200
)
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100 ≤ d ≤ 200.
Apollo needs to find his best response, by making the bid a∗ such that
a∗ = argmaxa∈IR+(A0 − a)F (a)
where A0 is his true value for the book, which is a random variable to Daphne since she
does not know it. Using basic calculus to find the maximum shows
0 =
d
da
(A0 − a)F (a) =
9a8
2009
(A0 − a)−
( a
200
)9
so Apollo’s bid should be 90% of his true value.
Daphne does not know Apollo’s value, but as a Bayesian, she has a subjective distribution
for it. Suppose she thinks it is the triangular distribution on on [$140, $200] with a peak
at $170. Then it follows that she thinks his bid will have the triangular distribution on
[$126, $180] with a peak at $153. If her true value for the book is $175, then her expected
profit is maximized with a bid of $161.67, which completes the level-2 analysis.
3 ARA in general
In ARA one takes the side of one agent, using only her beliefs and knowledge, rather
than assuming CK and trying to solve all of the agents’ problems simultaneously. The
selected agent must have (1) a subjective probability about the actions of each opponent,
(2) subjective conditional probabilities about the outcome for every set of possible choices,
and (3) accurate knowledge of her own utility function. Obviously, in practice a person
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1 2 3 4 5 6
0 uA pA(·|d, a) piA(d) uD pD(·|d, a) piD(a)
1 U1A P
1
A(·|d, a) Π
1
A(d) U
1
D P
1
D(·|d, a) Π
1
D(a)
2 U2A P
2
A(·|d, a) Π
2
A(d) U
2
D P
2
D(·|d, a) Π
2
D(a)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Table 1: Cognitive load for different kinds of ARA.
will only have approximate knowledge of these quantities, but that is sufficient for many
applications.
Thus Daphne believes Apollo has probability piD(a) of choosing action a ∈ A. She has
a subjective probability pD(s | d, a) for each possible outcome s ∈ S given every choice
(d, a) ∈ D × A, where D is Daphne’s set of possible actions. And she knows her own
utility uD(d, a, s) for each combination of outcome and pair of choices.
Daphne maximizes her expected utility by choosing the action d∗ such that
d∗ = argmaxd∈D IEpiD,pD [uD(d,A, S)]
= argmaxd∈D
∫
s∈S
∫
a∈A
uD(d, a, s)pD(s | d, a)piD(a) da ds
where A is the random action chosen by Apollo and S is the random outcome that results
from choosing A and d.
In practice, the most difficult quantity to obtain is piD(a). The pD(s | d, a) is found by
conventional risk analysis and uD(d, a, s) is a personal utility. Risk analysis and utility self-
assessment are not easy, but both are mature fields and researchers know how to proceed.
Previously, we laid out ARA methods for obtaining piD(a) in auctions for the cases of the
the non-strategic opponent, the Nash equilibrium seeking opponent, the opponent whose
analysis mirrors that of the decision-maker, and the opponent who is a level-k thinker.
Implementing these approaches imposes different cognitive loads upon the analyst.
Table 1 shows how the cognitive load depends upon the kind of ARA. Each row corresponds
to a different level of reasoning in level-k thinking. It displays the quantities that Daphne
must assess in order to implement a level-k analysis. Row 0 corresponds to the utilities and
beliefs of Daphne and Apollo, as perceived by themselves. Subsequently, row k contains the
additional utilities and probabilities that Daphne would have to assess in order to perform
a level-k analysis. The upper case characters in rows 1 and greater indicate that these
quantities are all random variables to Daphne.
The first column contains the utility functions she ascribes to Apollo. The second column
contains the conditional probabilities of the outcome, given her choice and Apollo’s, that
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she ascribes to Apollo. The third column contains what she thinks is Apollo’s distribution
over her choice. The fourth column contains what Daphne believes are the utility functions
that Apollo ascribes to her. The fifth column contains the probabilities of the outcome,
conditional on both her action and Apollo’s, that she believes Apollo ascribes to her. The
sixth column contains her opinion of what Apollo thinks is her distribution for he will do.
In terms of the table, different solution concepts require information in different cells:
• Traditional game theory requires cells (0,1), (0,2), (0,4), (0,5) and assumes that these
are CK.
• The non-strategic adversary analysis requires cells (0,4), (0,5) and (0,6), where the
(0,6) cell is assessed from historical data and/or expert opinion.
• When the adversary seeks a Nash equilibrium solution, the analysis requires cells
(0,4), (0,5) and (1,1), (1,2), (1,4), and (1,5). It uses these last four cells to infer cell
(0,6).
• The level-k adversary approach requires cells (0,4), (0,5) and:
– for a level-1 analysis, cells (1,1), (1,2) and (1,3) can produce (0,6);
– for a level-2 analysis, cells (2,4), (2,5) and (2,6) produce (1,3), which, with
(1,1), and (1,2) then produce (0,6);
– and so forth for larger k.
• The mirror equilibrium approach requires cells (0,4), (0,5) and uses a consistency
condition between (1,1), (1,2), (1,3) and (1,4), (1,5) and (1,6) to produce (0,6).
The main message is that all of these methods entail significant effort.
4 Basic concepts in ARA
In this section, we compare game-theoretic and ARA concepts in two template models.
Their basic structures may be simplified or made more complex, by removing or adding
nodes. Assume there is a defender (D) who chooses her decision d ∈ D and an attacker
(A) who chooses his attack a ∈ A. In principle, the agents are assumed to act so as to
maximize expected utility (or minimize expected loss) (French and Rios Insua, 2000). Bi-
agent influence diagrams (BAIDS) (Banks et al., 2015) describe the problems: the circular
nodes represent uncertainties, the hexagonal show utilities, and square nodes indicate de-
cisions. The arrows point to decision nodes (meaning that decisions are made given the
values of preceding nodes) or chance and utility nodes (these events or consequences are
influenced by predecessors). Colored nodes indicate relevance to just one of the agents
(white, defender; gray, attacker), striped nodes are relevant to both agents.
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4.1 Simultaneous defend-attack games
First consider simultaneous games—the agents decide their actions without knowing the
action chosen by each other. Its template is shown in Fig. 1.
SD A
UD UA
Figure 1: Basic two player simultaneous defend-attack game.
The consequences for both agents depend upon the outcome of the attack, s ∈ S. Each
agent has their own assessment on the probability of s, which depends on d and a, respec-
tively called pD(s|d, a) and pA(s|d, a). Similarly, their utility functions are uD(d, a, s) and
uA(d, a, s). Both agents A andD know the expected utility that a pair (d, a) would provide
them, ψA(d, a) =
∫
uA(d, a, s)pA(s|d, a) ds, and ψD(d, a) =
∫
uD(d, a, s)pD(s|d, a) ds.
A Nash equilibrium (NE) (d∗, a∗) in this game satisfies ψD(d
∗, a∗) ≥ ψD(d, a
∗) ∀ d ∈ D
and ψA(d
∗, a∗) ≥ ψA(d
∗, a) ∀ a ∈ A.
If utilities and probabilities are not CK, one may model the game as one with incomplete
information (Harsanyi, 1967) using the notion of types: each player will have a type known
to him but not to the opponent, and thus is private information. The type τi ∈ Ti deter-
mines the agent’s utility ui(d, a, s, τi) and probability pi(s|d, a, τi), i ∈ {A,D}. Harsanyi
proposes Bayes-Nash equilibria (BNE) as solution concept, still under a strong CK as-
sumption: the adversaries’ beliefs about types are CK through a common prior pi(τD, τA)
(moreover, the players’ beliefs about other uncertainties in the problem are also CK). De-
fine strategy functions by associating a decision with each type, d : τD → d(τD) ∈ D, and
a : τA → a(τA) ∈ A. Agent D’s expected utility associated with a pair of strategies (d, a),
given her type τD ∈ TD, is
ψD(d(τD), a, τD) =
∫ ∫
uD(d(τD), a, s, τD)pD(s|d(τD), a(τA), τD)pi(τA|τD) dτAds.
Similarly, we compute the attacker’s expected utility ψA(d, a(τA), τA). Then, a BNE is a
pair (d∗, a∗) of strategy functions satisfying
ψD(d
∗(τD), a
∗, τD) ≥ ψD(d(τD), a
∗, τD), ∀ τD
ψA(d
∗, a∗(τA), τA) ≥ ψA(d
∗, a(τA), τA), ∀ τA
for every d and every a, respectively.
However, the common prior assumptions are still unrealistic (Antos and Pfeffer, 2010), e.g.
in security contexts. We thus weaken them when supporting D, who should maximize her
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expected utility through
d∗ = argmax
d∈D
∫ ∫
uD(d, a, s)pD(s | d, a)piD(a) ds da = argmax
d∈D
∫
ψD(d, a)piD(a) da,
(3)
where piD(a) models her beliefs about the attacker’s decision a. To assess such probability
distribution, suppose D thinks that A maximizes expected utility, so that he seeks
a∗ = argmaxa∈A
∫ [∫
uA(d, a, s)pA(s|d, a) ds
]
piA(d) dd. She will typically be uncertain
about A’s required inputs (uA, pA, piA). If one models all information available to her about
these elements through a subjective probability distribution F ∼ (UA, PA,ΠA), mimicking
(3), one propagates the uncertainty into the distribution of
A | D ∼ argmax
a∈A
∫ [∫
UA(d, a, s) PA(s | d, a) ds
]
ΠA(D = d) dd. (4)
Usually, to estimate piD(a) we use Monte Carlo simulation, drawing K samples from F{
ukA, p
k
A, pi
k
A
}K
k=1
∼ F , finding for each of them
A∗k = argmax
a∈A
∫ [∫
ukA(d, a, s) p
k
A(s | d, a) ds
]
pikA(d) dd.
and approximating piD(a) using the empirical frequencies
piD(d) =
# {A∗k = d}
K
UA and PA may be directly elicited from D. However, eliciting ΠA may require deeper
analysis and level-k thinking as she needs to model how A analyzes D’s problem (this
is why we condition on the distribution of D in (4)). This entails computing D | A1 ∼
argmaxd∈D
∫ ∫
UD(d, a, s) PD(s | d, a) ds ΠD(A
1 = a) da, assuming she is able to
assess: (UD, PD), representing her knowledge about how A estimates uD(d, a, s) and
pD(s|d, a); and ΠD(A
1), her beliefs about A’s estimate of the probability of the defender
playing action d. A1 is A’s random decision within D’s second level of recursive thinking.
Again, eliciting this last element may require further thinking from D, leading to a recur-
sion of nested models, related to the level-k thinking concept in Stahl and Wilson (1994).
This recursion might stop at a level in whichD lacks the information necessary to assess the
corresponding distributions. At that point, she could assign a non-informative distribution
(French and Rios Insua, 2000). Further details are in Rios and Rios Insua (2012).
In general, and particularly in simultaneous games, ARA and game theory use different
conditions and assumptions, so it is natural that they lead to different solutions see, for in-
stance, a cybersecurity example in Rios Insua et al. (2019). As shown in Ekin et al. (2019),
ARA solutions tend to be more robust than NE. This is related with the fact that NE so-
lutions are based on point estimates of the attacker’s judgments, whereas ARA solutions
take account of the uncertainty about such estimates, leading to solutions that better reflect
the analyst’s beliefs. Also, in the particular case of simultaneous games, BNE and ARA
solutions do not necessarily coincide.
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4.2 Sequential defend-attack games
Consider now sequential games. The defender chooses her decision d and then A, after
observing d, chooses his attack a. The BAID for this game is shown in Figure 2. The arc
from D to A indicates that D’s choice is known to A. This situation has been called the
sequential Defend-Attack (Brown et al., 2006) game or Stackelberg game (Gibbons, 1992).
SD A
UD UA
Figure 2: Basic two player sequential defend-attack game
The game-theoretic solution does not require A to know D’s judgments, as he observes her
decision. However, D must know those of A, which is the CK condition in this case. To
solve, one computes both agents’ expected utilities at node S: ψA(d, a) and ψD(d, a). and
finds a∗(d) = argmaxa∈A ψA(d, a), A’s best response toD’s action d. Then,D’s optimal
action is d∗GT = argmaxd∈D ψD(d, a
∗(d)). The pair
(
d∗GT, a
∗(d∗GT)
)
is a Nash equilibrium
and, indeed, a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
The CK condition is weakened if we assume only partial information, leading to games
under incomplete information (Harsanyi, 1967). In this case, to model D’s uncertainty
about A’s elements, the attacker is assumed to belong to a certain type τA, unknown to the
defender. A’s optimal response to d depends on his type, and is denoted as a∗(d, τA). If we
model D’s uncertainty about τA through a prior pi(τA), clearly, D’s optimal action is
argmax
d∈D
∫
ψD[d, a
∗(d, τA)]pi(τA) dτA. (5)
The ARA approach to sequential games is different in its formulation. Given the lack of
CK, D is uncertain about the attacker’s response to her action d and models this uncer-
tainty through the distribution pD(a|d). Then, her expected utility would be ψD(d) =∫
ψD(d, a) pD(a|d) da with optimal decision d
∗
ARA = argmaxd∈D ψD(d).
To elicit pD(a|d), D benefits from modeling A’s problem. For this, she would use all infor-
mation available about uA and pA to model her uncertainty about these elements through
a distribution F = (UA, PA) over the space of utilities and probabilities. This induces
a distribution over A’s expected utility, being his random expected utility is ΨA(d, a) =∫
UA(d, a, s)PA(s|d, a) ds. Then, D finds pD(a|d) = PF [a = argmaxx∈AΨA(x, d)]. In
general, one can use Monte Carlo (MC) simulation to approximate pD(a|d).
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As in simultaneous games, NE and ARA solutions are different in this sequential setting,
as they are based in different assumptions. However, BNE and ARA solutions coincide
in this case, although their operational interpretations are quite different. As mentioned,
computing the ARA solutions requires eliciting pD(a|d), which in turn requires modelling
D’s uncertainty about A’s elements through a distribution F = (UA, PA) over the space
of utilities and probabilities. Without loss of generality, assume that both UA and PA are
defined over a common probability space (Ω,A,P) with atomic elements ω ∈ Ω (Chung,
2001). This induces a distribution over the Attacker’s expected utility ψA(d, a), being its
random expected utility ΨωA(d, a) =
∫
UωA(d, a, s)P
ω
A (s|d, a) ds. In turn, this induces a
random optimal alternative defined through A∗(d)ω = argmaxx∈AΨ
ω
A(d, x). Then, the
defender would find
pD(a|d) = PF [A
∗(d) = a] = P(ω : A∗(d)ω = a). (6)
Now, ω and P could be reinterpreted, respectively, as the type τA and the common prior
pi in Harsanyi’s doctrine. Obviously, PωA and U
ω
A correspond to A’s probability and utility
given his type, respectively; and A∗(d)ω = a∗(d, τA) in this new interpretation. With this
in mind, the connection between BNE and ARA is straightforward. Notice that we can
rewrite the BNE solution for the defender (5) as
argmax
d∈D
∫ [∫
ψD(d, a)δ(a − a
∗(d, τA)) da
]
pi(τA) dτA,
where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function. If we change the order of the integrals on a and τA
we get
argmax
d∈D
∫
ψD(d, a)
[∫
δ(a− a∗(d, τA))pi(τA) dτA
]
da. (7)
Clearly, ∫
δ(a− a∗(d, τA))pi(τA) dτA = P(τA : a
∗(d, τA) = a) = pD(a|d), (8)
where the last step follows from (6). Inserting (8) into (7), we recover the ARA formulation
of the sequential game. Thus, in the sequential Defend-Attack game, one can interpret the
ARA approach in terms of Harsanyi’s, although the underlying principles are different. The
take home message is that ARA provides a formal decision theoretic based approach to
specify the types τA and the prior pi(τA), thus facilitating the implementation of Bayesian
games as we discuss in Section 6.2 in the general case of facing more than one opponent.
5 Game Theory and ARA: Further relations
ARA operationalizes the Bayesian approach to games (Kadane and Larkey, 1982; Raiffa,
1982), constructing a procedure to make probabilistic predictions about the decisions of
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an opponent. This section details the relationship between ARA and core foundational
concepts in game theory.
We consider again two agents, a defender D and attacker A. To simplify the discussion,
assume there is certainty about the actions’ consequences and the utilities the agents obtain
(should the outcome conditional on the actions be random, one would operate with expected
utilities after modeling uncertainty). Each agent has a finite set of possible actions, denoted
D and A respectively. We discuss the case in which both agents simultaneously implement
their actions and obtain their respective utilities ui(d, a), i ∈ {A,D}, which they want to
maximize. Assume one can build a distribution piD(a) that expresses D’s beliefs about A’s
decision. Then, the defender should solve
d∗ = argmax
d∈D
∑
a∈A
uD(d, a)piD(a). (9)
This is just the Bayesian approach to games, initiated by Kadane and Larkey (1982), Raiffa
(1982) and Raiffa et al. (2002) in non-constructive ways. It has been criticized by Harsanyi
(1982) and Myerson (1997), among others. Before ARA, there was no formal methodology
allowing the analyst to encode her subjective probabilities on the actions of the other agents.
Of course, one could claim just deploying standard probability elicitation methods for such
purpose (O’Hagan et al., 2006), however Rı´os Insua et al. (2019) demonstrate the benefits
of the decomposition adopted in ARA in adversarial elicitation.
Armed with this setting, we discuss the ARA perspective of several key concepts in game
theory, beyond the relations with Nash and Bayes Nash equilibria concepts outlined above.
ARA solutions and dominance. A major tenet in game theory is that the actions pro-
posed for the agents should be non-dominated. It is easy to show that ARA actions are
non-dominated under fairly general conditions (Esteban et al., 2020).
Proposition 1 If piD(a) > 0 for every a ∈ A, then the ARA action d
∗ defined in (9) is
non-dominated.
ARA solutions and iterative dominance Besides dominance, another key rationality
concept in game theory is iterative dominance (Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 2004).
Note, however, that if the opponent’s payoff is unknown to the defender, due to the absence
of CK, then the agent using ARA will not know which are the non-dominated actions of
the rest. However, she can consider possible rankings of the corresponding random utilities
and use those to her advantage. The strongest case is when the attacker always gets more
utility with one of his actions than with any other, as perceived by the ARA analyst.
Consider the defender’s analysis of her opponent, then (Esteban et al., 2020)
Proposition 2 Let UA(d, a) be the (random) utility that A receives, according to D, when
he implements his a and D plays d. Suppose that there are two actions a and a′ for the
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attacker such that
max supp[UA(d, a)] < min supp[UA(d, a
′)],
for every d. Then, piD(a) = 0.
As a consequence, one can perform an ARA analogue of iterative dominance as follows.
First, eliminate the dominated actions of the defender by means of Proposition 1; then,
eliminate actions of the attacker using Proposition 2. Once completed, try again to eliminate
actions from the defender, and repeat until no alternative can be eliminated.
ARA can mimic less demanding conditions than the dominance in Proposition 2, employ-
ing ideas from stochastic dominance (Levy, 1998), including state dominance, first order
stochastic dominance or second order stochastic dominance.
ARA and ficticious play One approach to formingD’s subjective probabilities about the
actions of her opponent is to use data from previous interactions among the agents, when
relevant history is available. For example, she might be a level-1 thinker who believes A
is non-strategic (a.k.a level-0 thinker). In that case, she can use a Dirichlet-multinomial
model, e.g. Gelman et al. (2020), and the expected predictive distribution over A’s i-th
action ai would be
piD(ai) =
αi + xi∑|A|
j=1 (αj + xj)
, (10)
where |A| is the cardinality of A, αi is the Dirichlet prior parameter over the probabil-
ity of ai and xi is the number of times that A previously implemented such action. This
approach is related with the fictitious play methodology in game theory, summarized in
Menache and Ozdaglar (2011). Under appropriate conditions (Brown, 1951), if all players
use fictitious play they converge to a NE as the number of plays grows to infinity. But
ARA uses it for just one player, it incorporates prior information and we work with a small
number of iterations. The approach is easily extended to cases in which agents have longer
memories.
ARA and level-1 thinking ARA can aid in eliciting the analyst’s beliefs about the other
agent by thinking about the problem he would solve. This would be
a∗ = argmax
a∈A
∑
d∈D
uA(d, a)piA(d),
where piA(d) represents A’s beliefs about D’s actions. Since CK does not hold, D does
not know uA nor piA, but she can describe that uncertainty with a random utility UA and
a random probability ΠA, as previously discussed. This leads her to compute the random
optimal action
A∗ = argmax
a∈A
∑
d∈D
UA(d, a)ΠA(d). (11)
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Then, the first agent would find
piD(a) = Pr(A
∗ = a).
Typically, as mentioned in Section 4.1, this would be estimated by simulation, sampling
fromUA andΠA, computing the corresponding optimal action and estimating its probability
through empirical frequencies.
ARA and level-k thinking. Assessing the random distribution ΠA(d) entails strategic
thinking since D needs to understand how A will model her decision problem. This can
lead to a hierarchy of decision-making problems as in Section 4.1. This analysis continues
recursively, creating the hierarchy of nested decision models. Thus, D selects her action
based upon a chain of reasoning of the form “I think that A thinks that I think...” which
will go k levels deep, depending on how sophisticated she believes her opponent is. This
is the level-k thinking approach in Stahl and Wilson (1995), who make it operational by
dynamic programming. However it seems more natural to stop the iteration when no more
information is reasonably available, and then use a non-informative prior for the random
probabilities and utilities.
6 Further topics
We cover now additional important topics in ARA. First of all, we focus on cases in which
other rationalities rather than maximum expected utility is assumed on behalf of the ad-
versaries. In addition, we have just deal with interactions between two agents. Next, we
discuss how the ARA methodology could be extended to multiagent setting. We also dis-
cuss more complex interactions between two agents than the ones introduced in Sections
4.1 and 4.2. We end the section discussing computational aspects of ARA.
6.1 Facing adversaries with other rationalities
Throughout the discussion, we have emphasised that all agents seek to maximize expected
utility. This is reasonable for the supported agent, as we have her available for dialogue, but
not so clear for the adversaries, who may be interested in hiding and concealing information.
But it is possible to use prospect theory instead of utility functions, or other rationalities
reflected in Section 3, and all the previous results follow in analogy. Another nice point
is the analyst does not have to suppose her opponent is using a single solution concept.
For example, she might believe her opponent has probability 1/3 of seeking a BNE, 1/3 of
being a level-0 thinker, and 1/3 of being a level-1 thinker. This creates a mixture model that
expresses her full uncertainty, and ARA can be used to solve this more complex problem.
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6.2 Facing more than one adversary
Consider a community of n agents. The i-th agent has a finite set Ai = {a
1
i , . . . , a
mi
i }
of possible actions, i = 1, . . . , n. The agents simultaneously implement their actions a =
(a1, . . . , an) and obtain their respective utilities ui(a), i = 1, . . . , n, which they want to
maximize. Assume one can build a distribution pi1(a2, . . . , an) = pi1(a-1) that expresses
the first agent’s beliefs about the decisions made by the other agents. In ARA, the first agent
should solve
a∗1 = argmax
a1∈A1
N1∑
j=1
u1(a1, a
j
-1)pi1(a
j
-1),
where N1 is the number of possible combinations of opponents’ actions. The reviewed
approaches to form this probabilities in the two agent case, can be extended to the multi-
agent setting.
For instance, when performing fictitious play, as in the two agents case, agent one could
use a Dirichlet-multinomial model where now the expected predictive distribution over all
agents’ actions excluding the first one would be
pi1(a
k
-1) =
αk + xk∑N1
j=1 (αj + xj)
, k = 1, . . . , N1
being αk the Dirichlet prior parameter over the probability of a
k
-1 and xk is the number of
times that the other agents previously implemented such action.
The level-1 thinking approach can also be extended to the multi-agent system. This entails
that agent 1 thinks about the problem that each of the other agents would solve. For the i-th
agent, it is
a∗i = argmax
ai∈Ai
Ni∑
j=1
ui(ai, a
j
-i)pii(a
j
-i),
where Ni is the number of possible combinations of agent i opponents’ actions and pii(a
j
-i)
represents the beliefs of the i-th agent about the actions of the others. Since CK does not
hold, the i-th agent does not know ui nor pii, but she can describe that uncertainty with a
random utility Ui and a random probability Πi, as previously discussed. This leads her to
compute the random optimal action
A∗i = argmax
x∈Ai
Ni∑
j=1
Ui(ai, a
j
-i)Πi(a
j
-i).
Then, pi1 would be assessed using
pi1(a
j
i ) = Pr(A
∗
i = a
j
i ), j = 1, . . . ,mi.
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Extending further steps in the level-k thinking approach to the case of several opponents is
theoretically straightforward, but comes at a higher computational cost. An example of the
ARA framework deployed in reinforcement learning scenarios with multiple agents can be
seen in Gallego et al. (2019b). To mitigate the computational cost entailed by the large size
of the sets of N1 and Ni above, we could assume conditional independence of the actions
of opponents.
6.3 Facing more complex interactions
Previously, this paper introduced BAIDs for a simple simultaneous game and a simple se-
quential game. Figure 3a reflects a template for the sequential defend-attack game leading
to the development of a contingency plan. But ARA can treat more challenging situations.
Figure 3b generalizes the sequential defend-attack case of Figure 2 to situations in which
the defender has private information V not shared with the attacker. Arc V −D shows that
information is known byD when she makes her decision; the lack of the arc V −A, shows
that this information is not known by A when making his decision. The uncertainty about
the outcome s depends on the actions by A and D, as well as on V .
Finally, Figure 3c depicts sequential defend-attack-defend games. In these, the defender
moves first choosing d1, then, the attacker chooses a after having observed d1, and finally
the defender, knowing the outcome s, her previous decision d1 and the attacker’s a, chooses
her final defense (mitigation) d2.
SD A
UD UA
(a) Sequential attack-defend.
SD A
UD UA
V
(b) Sequential defend-attack
with private information.
SD1 A
UD UA
D2
(c) Sequential defend-attack-
defend.
Figure 3: Bi-agent influence diagrams for ARA templates.
Beyond these game structures, there can be more general and complex interactions between
agents. Such BAIDS can be analyzed using methods described in Gonza´lez-Ortega et al.
(2019).
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6.4 An ARA computational pipeline
Based on the BAID game templates, here is a general computational pipeline for ARA.
1. Modeling system threats. Represent the attacker’s problem from the defender’s per-
spective through an influence diagram (ID). The attacker’s key features are his goals, knowl-
edge and capabilities. Assessing these require determining the actions he may undertake
and the utility that he perceives when performing them, given a defender’s strategy. The
output is the set of attacker’s decision nodes, together with the value node and arcs in-
dicating how his utility depends on his decisions and those of the defender. Assessing
the attacker’s knowledge entails looking for relevant information that he may have when
performing the attack, and his degree of knowledge about this information, as we do not
assume CK. This entails not only a modeling activity, but also a security assessment of the
system to determine which of its elements are accessible to the attacker. The outputs are
the uncertainty nodes of the attacker ID, the arcs connecting them and those ending in the
decision nodes, indicating the information available to A when attacking. Finally, identi-
fying his capabilities requires determining which part of the defender problem the attacker
has influence upon. This enables the attacker ID to connect with that of the defender.
2. Simulating attacks. Based on step 1, a mechanism is required to simulate reasonable
attacks. The state of the art solution assumes that the attacker seeks an NE, given strong CK
hypothesis. The ARAmethodology relaxes such assumptions, through a procedure to simu-
late adversarial decisions. Starting with the adversary model in step 1, the uncertainty about
his probabilities and utilities is propagated to his problem and leads to the corresponding
random optimal adversarial decisions which provide the required simulation.
3. Adopting defenses. Augment the defender’s problem by incorporating the attacker’s
problem produced in step 1. As output, generate a BAID reflecting the dual confrontation.
Finally, solve the defender’s problem by maximizing her subjective expected utility, inte-
grating out all attacker decisions, which are random from the defender’s perspective given
the lack of CK. In general, the corresponding integrals are approximated through MC, sim-
ulating attacks consistent with our knowledge about the attacker using the mechanism of
step 2.
Thus, from a computational point of view, given a defense policy, one simulates from the
attacker’s problem to forecast the attacks and that enables the defender problem to find her
optimal policies. One can improve this general approach by taking advantage of the dy-
namic and informational structure of the BAID underlying the problem. One alternates be-
tween simulation and optimization as described in Gonza´lez-Ortega et al. (2019). But one
still needs to simulate and optimize which can be computationally intensive. One possibil-
ity to alleviate this is to jointly the simulate and the optimize with the aid of the augmented
simulation approach Ekin et al. (2019).
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7 Applications
Section 2 introduced basic concepts in ARA through an auction example. Further details
may be seen in Banks et al. (2015). Beyond that, applications in other areas abound. Many
traditional applications of game theory in which CK conditions are debatable could be re-
visited from the ARA perspective. Important ARA applications are in defense, counter-
terrorism, security, cybersecurity risk analysis.
Regarding defense, Wang and Banks (2011) applies ARA to the problem of selecting a
route through a network where an opponent chooses vertices for ambush. The methodology
in that paper could be applied to convoy routing problems when there may be improvised
explosive devices and imperfect information about their locations. Sevillano et al. (2012)
uses ARA to support the owner of a ship in managing piracy risk; it models the situation
using a defend-attack-defend game, in which CK is not assumed. Roponen and Salo (2016)
considers ARA to enhance combat models and Roponen et al. (2020) uses it to protect from
unmanned aerial vehicles.
The area of counterterrorism has also seen relevant applications of ARA. Rios and Insua
(2012) provide general ARA models including defend-attack models, sequential defend-
attack-defend models, and sequential defend-attack models with private information. These
may be used as building blocks for more specific risk analysis of counterterrorism prob-
lems. For instance, Gil and Parra-Arnau (2019) studies counter-terrorist online surveillance
from an ARA perspective, focusing on the problem of monitoring a set of websites through
classification of profiles suspected of carrying out terrorist attacks. Rios Insua et al. (2016)
deals with critical infrastructure protection studying security resource allocation decision
processes for an organization which faces multiple threats over multiple sites, specifically
using a railways network.
Regarding urban security, applications in resource allocation have attracted interest. For
example, Gil et al. (2016) uses ARA to allocate security resources to protect urban spaces,
taking their spatial structure into account. In cybersecurity, Rios Insua et al. (2019) pro-
vides a comprehensive framework for cybersecurity risk analysis, covering the presence of
both intentional and non-intentional threats and the use of insurance as part of the security
portfolio. Naveiro et al. (2019) applies ARA to the emerging field of adversarial machine
learning. In particular, it shows how to protect statistical classification systems from attack-
ers trying to fool them by intentionally modifying input data.
Finally, it is worth mentioning ARA applications in social robotics, such as the one in
Esteban and Insua (2014). They illustrate how to use ARA to support the decision mak-
ing of an autonomous agent that interacts with other agents and people in a competitive
environment
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8 Conclusions
This has been a brief overview on adversarial risk analysis, its key concepts, methods and
applications. But there remain many open topics.
First, a promising line for future research is to extend ARA methodology to deal with re-
peated play. The structure of these problems allows learning from past adversarial actions
via Bayesian updating of the defender’s beliefs about her opponent’s unknowns. These
models could be especially useful in games in which actions are taken in continuous time,
also known as differential games (Dockner et al., 2000). In addition, interest in ARA in
multi-agent reinforcement learning has recently risen (Gallego et al., 2019a). Research
in multi-agent reinforcement learning has mainly focused in modeling the whole system
through Markov games. However, the problem of supporting a single agent facing one or
more opponents in a reinforcement learning setting is largely unexplored.
As we have seen, ARA relaxes crucial assumptions such as CK, thereby increasing real-
ism. However, this comes at involved computations. Research on efficient approaches for
ARA is crucial. For instance, exploring gradient-based techniques for sequential games is
a fruitful line of research. Naveiro and Insua (2019) provides an efficient solution method
for sequential defend-attack games under the game-theoretic paradigm which could be ex-
tended to deal with the ARA setting. In addition, ARA entails simulating from the attacker’s
problem to forecast attacks and then optimizes for the defender to find her decision. This
two-stage computation is demanding and single stage methods could reduce computation.
Initial ideas based on augmented probability simulation are in Ekin et al. (2019).
Finally, much research can be conducted in the applied side. For instance, regarding ap-
plications of ARA to adversarial machine learning problems, Naveiro et al. (2019) aims
at robustifying classification systems against adversarial threats. Extensions of such tech-
niques to regression or time series problems would be interesting. A broad overview on
adversarial machine learning is in Rı´os Insua et al. (2019). Malware detection, fake news
detection and autonomous vehicles security are just a few examples of important societal
applications of AML.
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